Somali Pirates, Corporate Insurgency and the Public Sector?

Could Somali pirates and Afghan insurgents teach public servants about management?

Professor David James at the Henley Business School thinks so. This article in the Economist details James' study of how these groups organize themselves and what students of management could learn from their approach.

James looked into why these small-scale operations with limited resources are able to triumph over giant, well-equipped oil tankers. What he found was that the pirates overcome the size differential by employing the tactic of asymmetrical conflict. That is, their small size affords them a mobility and tactile ease not available to their targets. James attributes the rapid growth of the Afghan insurgency in part to the Taliban's "brand-agnosticism". By not attempting to micro-manage local cells adopting the Taliban name, the organization grows in power without losing the flexibility and adaptability available to smaller organizations. These two examples reminded me of Bolman and Deal's discussion on organizational structure. The Somali pirates resemble simple hierarchies - "mom and pop organizations" while the Afghan insurgents exhibits characteristics of adhocracy or a web of inclusion.

James uses his findings in trainings he delivers on "Corporate Insurgency", teaching small start-ups how to steal market-share from industry giants. At the same time, James condemns the actions of his study-subjects. I cannot help but question this approach - even if the tactics are legal, do we really want companies to be modeling their management styles after violent criminals? And what are the implications for the public and non-profit sectors, which supposedly have much to learn from the management style of their more efficient and effective cousin. If our aim is the public good, then perhaps our ends and our means should align. And if this is the case, perhaps we need to look elsewhere for models of management?